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COMMENT
By

EDWARD SCHWARrZ*

F

OR the past two years, many of the people at this conference have
been meeting almost bimonthly to rehash a set of familiar issues
concerning student rights. We acknowledged at these meetings our
general agreement on the nature of due process; we recounted the
latest instance of the elimination of a campus speaker ban; we debated whether student political organizing should remain free from
administrative control; we took a peek at the rising incidence of spying on the campus; and, in general, we patted ourselves on the back
and agreed that higher education is making progress in these areas.
Now we meet again to reenact the same ritual. Judging from
the list of panelists and the familiar panoply of faces in the audience,
I greatly fear that this is all that we will accomplish. In the fall of
1966, some of us on the drafting commission for the joint Statement
on Rights and Freedoms of Students warned that the discussion of
educational problems had to encompass much more than questions of
rights, and that students had gone far beyond those questions. We
were told, "You're right, but not now." We acquiesced, went along
with the context in which the Statement was framed, and waited for
the new discussion. The joint Statement has been ratified by all
participating groups; the conversation has not changed.
I am not here primarily to discuss legal rights of students, but
to suggest the reasons why the debate over legal rights is a substitute
for a consideration of the real issues which we should be considering.
I have done this before, but I feel a special urgency in doing so now.
This will be my last presentation to an educational conference as
President of the National Student Association. While I have no
doubt that my successor will continue the work which we have
started, I feel a special responsibility to make my parting shot an
extensive one. I have dealt with you reasonably in the past, but my
attempts to be reasonable have not evoked the debate which I had
intended. We now have witnessed over 30 major confrontations in
the past month - a phenomenon which we predicted. You must
understand that these uprisings will continue until, and unless, you
begin to face up to the new issues.
New issue number one - student power. Can students control
their own affairs, influence curricular decisions, and participate in
policy formulation basic to university life? I have yet to hear any
serious answers to these questions. Contrary to the view that your
*President, United States National Student Association; A.B., Oberlin College, 1965.
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organizations are more "liberal" than their constituencies, the
campuses are way ahead of most of you in conducting this discussion.
New issue number two - the shape of the curriculum. This includes grading policies, teacher-student relationships, the state of the
disciplines, freshman orientation, and freshman year programs. We
skirt these issues in these gatherings, but, again, have rarely dealt
with them in other than a perfunctory manner.
New issue number three - the relationship between the university and society. The Students for a Democratic Society have been
leading battles in this area during the past year, but you can expect
that the National Student Association will join the fray next fall.
For whom, and for what reason, should university research be conducted? Where do universities invest their money? What relationships exist between universities and local police forces? I have yet
to hear anyone here challenge the political stance of much of higher
education. How many disruptions will it take to bring those questions to your attention?
These are the themes which animate student activity in 1968
and which get to the heart of the problems currently facing higher
education. These are the themes of the conference that must be
held. Yet, conferences which are being held ignore them. Even when
only because some of you
a new topic bursts to the surface -if
cannot hold back what is on your minds- it emerges in a useless
context. Questions of spy systems on campuses are discussed solely in
terms of the right to privacy, rarely in terms of what it means for a
university to cooperate with police forces. Students who question
university investments in war research are informed of the university's "right" to invest resources in such research, rather than of the
rationale of the institution for doing so. Issues involving university
ownership of slum tenements in the ghettos are considered in terms
of the student's "competence" to pose such questions. Whenever a
new area is raised, you try to fit it into an old framework which is
entirely inadequate to the problem.
What I must ask is, "Why?" Why are you afraid to engage in
an honest discourse of the issues which are exploding on the campus?
Why is there a two or three year gap between the introduction of a
question on 50 campuses and its serious consideration at the conferences? I want to devote some time to answering my own questions,
both in relation to student rights in general, and to student legal
rights in particular.
Most of you approach social questions in the framework of what
I would call procedural liberalism. Procedural liberalism posits a
kind of billiard ball view of society by which individuals are granted
the freedom to act autonomously, so long as they do not "destroy the
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rights of others." The two critical tasks of procedural liberalism are
the construction of definitions of individual freedom and the creation of mechanisms to protect these autonomous beings from one
another. As long as we can say that man is "free," then we need not
worry about the ways in which he uses his freedom, the ways in
which he accepts the "rules of the game" which protect his freedom,
or the ways in which his institutions promote his welfare.
The central treatises in defense of mass education spring very
much from these premises. Clark Kerr's The Uses of the University,1
for example, exalts the multiversity on grounds that it provides a
number of options for individual fulfillment and that its procedures
enable an accommodation between the conflicting forces acting upon
the institution. If the options remain varied, and the university president remains a skillful mediator, then the multiversity will remain a
wholesome environment for growth. The gravest threats to its
existence, by these theories, arise when an agency of the public attempts to close an option or restrict a freedom, or when a group
within the university no longer accepts the "rules of the game" as
being sufficient to guarantee the success of a political objective.
As Kerr learned, and as others should learn as well, guarantees
of individual freedom and political order are insufficient. Men may
desire an expanding relationship between one another, a sense of
community within their environment which transcends questions of
freedom and order. Two lovers do not create courts to handle their
quarrels - if they worry first about how to protect themselves from
one another, they cease to love. The problem in mass life involves
the creation of a lover's relationship between people. When such a
relationship does not exist, modern man feels atomized, cut off,
alone, alienated. No number of options in the supermarket, or procedures for his protection, can compensate for his internal sense
of loss.
The three "new issues" which I suggested are directly related to
this general problem of mass society and mass universities - the
problem of creating community within our institutions. Student
power, as a battle cry, asks that students be accepted in an entirely
new relationship with administrators and faculty, and that the doctrines which relegate students to a limited "role" be replaced by a
framework which shows greater respect for students as people. The
drive for educational innovation- particularly that part of the drive
which challenges faculty teaching, grading, and the processes of the
classroom - is really asking that professors take as much interest
in their students as people as they do in their disciplines as subjects.
The challenges raised concerning the university's relationship to
1
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society subject the institutions to criteria of humaneness: Is the university racist? Is it militarist?
I suspect that an important part of administrative resistance to
serious consideration of the questions stems from their failure to
grasp the context in which they are raised. After all, communitarian
literature is uncommon to the American political experience, even
though working class and ghetto community life has been important
to its development. College presidents are more schooled in Locke
than Rousseau, and in Locke, the man and his work are more important than the relationships between men. To college presidents,
students are not subjects, they are objects - beings who must be
processed, nurtured, and "prepared" for life. As Buber noted, one
does not develop a healthy relationship with an object. The student
who tries to move from "I-it" to "I-thou" with other members of
the academic community often learns that his elders are not prepared
to accept him on that basis, nor prepared to view him in that way.
Similarly, the procedural liberal who fancies himself to be "on
the student's side" often fails to grasp what students are telling him.
To be sure, the number of occasions upon which the liberal must defend student freedom does make him an ally, since higher education
debases both student liberty and student community. Yet the liberal
is equipped with neither the theoretical framework nor, in some
cases, the personal resources to cope with student questions about
community relationships. He often seems more impressed with the
manner in which the student case is argued than in the case itself,
and, in recent times, he is more interested in the process and aftermath of a protest than in its substance. I have been asked several
times in the past few weeks to state my reactions to building seizures.
At no time have I been asked whether universities should engage in
secret research for the war in Vietnam. In short, the procedural
liberal is trying to construct better rules for an old game, when the
students are trying to change the nature of the game itself.
Even in making judgments on the process of the campus as it
is, the procedural liberal finds himself ill served by his theories.
His "rules of the game" dictate that everyone remain a gentleman,
regardless of his real political position. Being "reasonable" may be
a luxury which only those who possess power can afford, but the
procedural liberal would counsel temperance to the powerless as well.
Occasionally, he has a blind faith that administrators will respond
to the "reasonable" style, a faith which only occasionally is justified.
Even when administrators do not respond, the procedural liberal
will contend that preservation of the appropriate process is more important than the attainment of a political goal.
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It is this kind of concern, I suspect, which motivated the convocation of this conference. On the surface, of course, it appears
that we are assembled here because we have a genuine interest in the
university and the law on its own terms. The fact that most of you
are either lawyers or procedural liberals in education reinforces this
impression. Yet I cannot approach this conference out of the context of the American Council on Education's principal document on
students and the law issued thus far - James Perkins' The University
and Due Process.2 The Perkins paper is not a legal document; it
is a political statement. It does not deal primarily with due process.
It does deal with all the reasons why students should not use the
courts to achieve their objectives, why the courts are "inappropriate"
to the rules of the educational game.
Having read Perkins' treatise, I can only conclude that your real
interest lies in determining "how far students will go" in using the
courts, and how far the courts will go in limiting your ability to
govern your universities. There was little of this nervous interest in
the law ten years ago, when all the decisions seemed to justify administrative hegemony over institutional affairs. It is only now that
the courts appear to be in favor of students that this conference has
been called. The law becomes important to you only when it limits
your power.
Perhaps I exaggerate, but the Perkins paper suggests that I do
not. The document itself is a classic example of procedural liberalism - it conjures up a chamber of horrors involving incompetent
judges rendering decisions on students' grades, personal behavior,
and a multitude of other matters. It pleads for a respect for the
autonomy of the university - at a time when universities are willingly embracing the Department of Defense, the Federal Narcotics
Bureau, and the neighborhood police force. Its whole tone says "Gentlemen, please, surely we can handle these matters on our own,
in a 'reasonable' fashion." No, I find it difficult to trust your concern for the law when you print treatises urging students not to use
the instruments of law as part of their strategy.
The real irony of Perkins' arguments is that they presuppose the
existence of a coherent strategy to build student legal rights in the
same way that the NAACP developed a strategy of court tests to win
civil rights for Negroes. Frankly, there is no such strategy. Most
of the significant cases in student rights - Green v. Howard University,' for example - emerged as a result of university dismissal
of students for a protest which had nothing to do with "rights."
2
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The protest may have tested the university's procedures, but its
purpose was to ask the administration to refuse to provide class rank
to draft boards. Once expelled, the students certainly do go to court
-to
gain readmittance! Characteristically, the procedural liberals
focus upon the court case, questioning whether students should have
gone to court, and then, questioning what the court said. The original
reasons for the protest are forgotten. The recent conflict at the
University of Denver serves as another example of this, since most
of us here are familiar with those events. Thirty-nine students staged
a sit-in at an administration building. The University chancellor
made himself a national hero by expelling them on the spot. Later,
he realized that expulsion without a hearing violates due process,
so he reversed the expulsions to let the hearing process run its course.
The Appeals Committee recommended probation, but the chancellor
proceeded with his original decision and expelled the students. Since
the entire procedure is open to question, the students will go to court.
I am led to believe that the university now awaits this challenge with
some eagerness, while all parties to the dispute have become amateur
lawyers.
Yet, why did these 39 students sit-in in the first place? What
were the conditions on the campus which led them to use that particular form of protest? What were their demands? What had been
the administration's response to these demands earlier in the year?
What were the kinds of students who sat in? What were the real
issues, as opposed to the immediate issues, surrounding the sit-in and
expulsions?
I sense the answers to these questions, having been in touch with
the leaders of the sit-in at several points during the year. For the
past two years, these students have been trying to awaken the apathetic student body of the University of Denver to the existence of a
war in Vietnam and a crisis in our cities. They have also been trying
to encourage the University administration to increase student power
and to reevaluate its curriculum. In both tasks, they have met with
resistance. Consequently, the sit-in emerged as a product of frustration, a last ditch attempt to arouse the University before this group
of activists graduated.
Of course, the chancellor of the University of Denver is now a
hero for expelling the students. From my standpoint, however, the
chancellor emerges as a paradigm of the educational villain - the
kind of man who worries more about the serenity of his campus than
about its intellectual and social vitality. Why wasn't this chancellor
as concerned as these student activists that the undergraduate population has capsulated itself against confronting the central social
questions of the day? Doesn't he find it somewhat strange that a
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university setting should be an excuse to evade issues rather than to
explore them? If he does, he gave no sign of his concern to the
activists. Yet he did show his concern when these students disrupted
the process of order.
It is clear that the procedural liberal loses himself in a tangle of
irrelevancies. His framework makes it impossible for him to grasp
the dimensions of student questions on campus- he tries to put
these questions in a context which cannot explain them. When students become frustrated with the lack of response accorded to their
protests and demands, then the procedural liberal spends time studying whether the form of the protest was "appropriate." When the
students go to court, the procedural liberal writes treatises explaining
why this was a bad move. Finally, he loses a few court cases and
convinces himself that he really is interested in the law and the university in its own right - even calls a conference to discuss it. In the
end, I suppose, we all become lawyers.
The questions which we are raising are too serious to be obscured in this manner. This year the conference focuses on the university and the law. Next year, I understand that there are several
gatherings planned on handling disruptions - conferences which
will deal with little more than tactical questions. Will you then try
to convince us that you are interested in conflict resolution on the
campus as an intellectual issue in its own right, and that commissioning the Rand Corporation to apply techniques of counterinsurgency
to universities is a logical extension of that interest? Will you argue,
as you argue now on the law, that your appreciation of game theory
reflects your immediate priority - maintaining order in your institutions - and that the more basic issues will have to wait upon the
resolution of that problem? How long can you deceive yourselves?
The point is that students are protesting the kind of mentality
which approaches educational questions in this manner, which views
the procedures of the university as overriding its substance, which
constructs avenues of freedom without channels for community,
which blinds itself to the relationships within the university and between the university and other institutions. Your response merely
imitates the conditions which students protest, merely proves the
point of their protest - that you are more interested in the protection
of yourselves, the efficient functioning of your campuses, and your
power to govern them than you are in creating healthier ties between
the people of the campus, between yourselves and the students. You
laughed when Mario Savio said, "Never trust anyone over thirty."
Yet his comment stemmed from the premises upon which procedural
liberalism operates - that people cannot afford to trust one another,
they can only afford to shield themselves and keep their distance.
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In the coming year, you will be met with a new round of campus
protests - no doubt as serious, if not more serious, than those which
you faced this spring. Some of you will become skillful counterinsurgents, others of you will learn how to use the police, and a few
of you may lose your jobs. Nevertheless, however adept you become
in handling tactics, the protests will not end until you become adept
at accepting change.
As a first step in that direction, I urge you to revise the ways in
which you view change and the ways in which you approach the
changes which are being asked of you. I have tried to help by outlining a few of the new concerns. Yet, if my analysis is valid, then
your intellectual agreement with my arguments will be insufficient.
What will be necessary is almost a psychic shift, by which you begin
to view the people and the dynamics of your institutions through
different emotional glasses. If and when you do so, you will begin
to feel, as well as understand, why I argue now that a conference on
the university and the law is irrelevant to what we should be discussing. Until you do so, you will always wonder why these conferences never seem to solve the problems, why they never seem to
get at what is on our minds. Yet, once you do so, the bimonthly
ritual of student rights' conferences will not continue. I believe you
won't stand for them either.

